Chinese Military-Civil Fusion Development Strategy and the Fourth Industrial Revolution
Introduction
The balance of power between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has been one of the key focuses of ongoing discussions around international relations and the future of the United States' supremacy on the world stage. China’s significant economic growth over the past few decades, as well as the development of its military forces, has called into question how much longer the United States will remain the leader in these two areas (Lee 2019). There’s also been the question of how China’s military development poses a threat to U.S. national security efforts. With China possessing the largest hacking network in the world, the United States has emphasised the safeguarding of U.S. technological information and infrastructure to ensure that it maintains its technological supremacy over China (Satter 2023). A prominent policy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), commonly referred to as “Military-Civil Fusion Development Strategy,” has made this effort somewhat difficult, as China has shifted towards utilising its extensive private sector to obtain technological information regarding dual-use technologies to advance both its economy and the modernisation of its military (Department of Defense 2023). Military-civil fusion development strategy, which is built on previous efforts at utilising China’s private sector for the development of dual-use technologies, has become a core policy of the Chinese Communist Party and poses a threat to US national security. This paper will examine the historical developments of Military-Civil Fusion as a development strategy in China and determine how its implementation may have an effect on the race between the United States and China to establish themselves as leaders in AI technology.
History of Civil-Military Integration
To understand the significance of the Chinese military-civil fusion development strategy (MCFDS), it’s important to establish a clear history of the initiative, including its origins, successes, and shortcomings for China’s economic and military development. Although military-civil fusion is a term coined recently by the Chinese Communist Party, the concept of a “fusion” between the economic sector and the military-industrial complex goes back multiple decades in China, with various other leaders making it a key policy in their vision of the development of China (Kania and Laskai 2021, 6-7). It’s also a policy that isn’t solely unique to China, as many other nations, both with state-run economies and free-enterprise economies, have seen some variations of combined efforts between the private sector and the military—one of the main examples of this being the United States during the Second World War and Cold War (Evron and Bitzinger 2023, 50). During the Second World War, much of the United States’s private industry and manufacturing was converted over to the production of military goods for the war effort. Following the Second World War and the beginning of the Cold War, the military-industrial complex grew significantly, with the United States military relying heavily on private industry to develop arms and technologies (Evron and Bitzinger 2023, 59). Given this extensive history of civil-military integration (CMI) around the world, establishing a clear history of China’s efforts allows for a clearer understanding of the threat it currently poses to the United States’s national security and relations between the two countries, as well as how its continued implementation will affect the dynamics of power over the next few decades.
While the literature on early Chinese efforts to implement this policy is somewhat limited (Fritz 2019), Richard Bitzinger provides a comprehensive analysis of the history of this initiative in his article titled “China's Shift from Civil-Military Integration to Military-Civil Fusion.” Civil-military integration policy originated in the early 1980s and extended into the mid-1990s as a broad-based effort by Deng Xiaoping to transform China’s economy through the conversion of military production facilities into commercial production facilities (Bitzinger 2021, 13). Although described by Deng Xiaoping as a way to integrate military and civilian-side activities in his “16-character policy,” civil-military integration wasn’t formalised until 1997 (Besha 2011, 102). This strategy aimed to diffuse production techniques used by commercial industries to improve Chinese military goods' production through a general diffusion of dual-use technology. As defined by the United States Bureau of Industry and Security, “dual-use technology” is a classification of technology which has both civilian and military uses (Bureau of Industry and Security 2013). This integration strategy was adopted by the CCP in hopes that an effective diffusion of Western technology would allow for more efficient procurement of arms for the Chinese military, going beyond just weapons buildup, and focusing on the development of effective production of modern naval ships and aircraft. Military production facilities were converted into commercial production facilities some of which worked with Western companies like Boeing and Airbus to produce commercial airliners, in hopes that the technology shared would be useful in the production of military planes (Bitzinger 2021, 13).
Despite this effort to develop dual-use technology through the conversion of military production facilities and acquiring the necessary information to reverse-engineer Western technology for the military, this strategy ultimately failed to produce significant developments in military production. One of the reasons for this failure was the technological limits, like end-user restrictions, which prevented the adaptation and use of said technologies from being converted for military use (Bitzinger 2021, 15). However, the CCP believed that these challenges could be overcome by broadening the scope of the initiative from military production sites producing commercial goods to joint initiatives between the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and China’s private industry to develop dual-use technologies. This shift was reflected in the 8th Five-Year Plan of the Chinese Communist Party where civil-military integration was explicitly mentioned for the first time (Fritz 2019). During this period, there was a major restructuring of the Chinese system of procurement, with the PLA assuming the responsibility of defence innovation and weapons R&D (Evron and Bitzinger 2023, 94). There was also a shift towards promoting competition in the defence industry by dividing the main defence industry groups into two corporations (Evron 2021, 30). However, this did little to promote competition as it increased the bureaucracy within these industries and resulted in a significant waste of resources (Evron 2021, 30). The most important aspect of this shift was the focus towards dual-use technologies developed by the private sector for both military and civilian use. Not only did the PLA engage with Chinese private industry for the development of dual-use technologies, but it also worked with Chinese universities to promote research of dual-use technologies (Evron and Bitzinger 2023, 107). While there were still some shortcomings with this approach, as mentioned previously, there were some benefits to be seen from this restructuring of the civil-military integration initiative. Chinese shipbuilding production during this period saw modernisation and improvement in the building of warships as a result of joint ventures with other major shipbuilding nations like Japan and South Korea (Evron and Bitzinger 2023, 107). A report by the Congressional Research Service titled, “China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress” identifies this period as the beginning of China’s naval modernisation efforts, and demonstrates that since the start of this policy, China’s shipbuilding capacities have surpassed that of the United States, which supports Bitzinger’s claim that shipbuilding in China benefitted from the policy of civil-military integration (Congressional Research Service 2024a, 2). Although this new approach did shift towards engaging with the private sector, ultimately there were very few developments in dual-use technology as private firms lacked the resources necessary to test and develop said technology. All the while, state-owned defence industries, which weren’t subject to market forces, dominated the procurement process in China (Evron 2021, 31).
The Rise of Xi Jinping and the Emphasis of MCFDS
The relative failures of CMI to effectively develop dual-use technologies for military modernisation brought about a need in China to once again reshape the scope of the strategy. The rise of Xi Jinping introduced a “New Era” in China characterised by the intent to establish China as a dominant power in the international sphere, both economically and militarily (Thompson 2020, 6-7). This need for a “rejuvenation” of the Chinese spirit calls for the elevation of China’s economy and military on the world stage (BBC 2013). Building off the failures of CMI, the Xi Jinping regime called for a major restructuring of China’s military-industrial complex which would expand the efforts of military procurement and the development of dual-use technologies. The initiative was renamed to “Military-Civil Fusion Development Strategy,” which broadened the initiative’s efforts to fully integrate the private industry into the PLA (Can and Vierira 2022, 85). One of the major changes that took place under Xi Jinping was the establishment of a more top-down structuring of MCF, with the party directly overseeing efforts to fuse the private sector and the military. New organisational bodies, such as the Equipment Development Department (EDD), which is directly overseen by the Central Military Commission (CMC), chaired by Xi Jinping, were established to centralise the efforts of armament and MCF and reduce the extensive bureaucracy that plagued previous efforts at expanding CMI to the private sector (Evron 2021, 31).
Despite this restructuring, there are inherent roadblocks in the initiative’s way that prevent its effective implementation and success in military modernisation. Firstly, Chinese procurement is still dominated by monopolistic state-owned companies, a problem which was present in CMI as well (Evron 2021, 31). A prominent reason why private Chinese companies generally fail to make considerable progress in the development of dual-use technology is the lack of incentives offered by the Chinese government for private companies, as well as the lack of general resources for R&D of advanced technologies and weapons systems which are afforded to state-owned companies. While incentives do exist, and investments have been made in expanding research facilities, it has yet to prove sufficient to promote innovation in the private sector (Evron 2021, 37-38). On top of that, the expansiveness of China’s MCF policy, and the broadness of protective laws in China have allowed, on multiple occasions, the theft of intellectual property by the state from private Chinese companies, thus discouraging private efforts at innovation (Chafetz 2023). Secondly, bureaucratic structures are still in place and often restrict the free innovation of private companies, as regulations on weapons development are significantly restraining in China (Manuel and Hicks 2020). This also contributes to the problem of the level of secrecy around China’s procurement and development of advanced technologies, which makes it difficult for joint efforts between the private sector and the government (Yang 2021, 63). Lastly, one of the major hurdles that China faces in its attempts at replication and adaptation of Western technology is the fact that the complexity of modern technology, compared to that of emerging technologies in the 20th century, is extremely complex and requires a sufficient development of “industrial, scientific, and technological capabilities required for becoming first-tier weapons manufacturers” (Gilli and Gilli 2019, 187) Unlike the technology itself, this is not an easily diffusable process but instead requires a significant amount of time and money to establish. The challenges China’s military-civil fusion strategy faces are significant and will likely hinder China’s ability to close the technological gap between itself and the United States (Evron 2021, 43). Nevertheless, China’s military growth over the past few decades has been significant and has made it the top competitor with the United States militarily and economically. Should these challenges be resolved, China’s military-civil fusion strategy could pave the way to rival the United States’ standing in the world as a technologically advanced military superpower.
Current Threats to U.S. National Security
Despite many of the shortcomings of both CMI and MCF, these initiatives still pose a substantial threat to U.S. national security (Kania and Laskai 2021, 7). Current literature identifies these shortcomings as substantially impeding China’s race to catch up with the United States technologically, but that doesn’t mean that these current efforts aren’t affecting relations between the United States and China. In a Department of Defense report presented to Congress in 2023 on the military developments of China, the DoD identifies MCF as a key strategy of China’s initiative to create a “world-class military” by 2035, rivalling that of the United States (Department of Defense 2023, 35). The report also specifically mentions how China is using extensive “cyber-enabled espionage” to develop and acquire Western information to support its military modernisation efforts (Deparment of Defense 2023, 170-171). Another problem the United States faces is the encompassing nature of MCF, which under Xi Jinping, seeks to incorporate all aspects of China’s economy and the private sector in the process of dual-use technology development. This could pose a challenge to the United States' efforts to control the diffusion of Western technology and information to China as it could be difficult to discern which Chinese companies are working with the government in developing dual-use technology and adapting Western technology to modernise the Chinese military. Attempting to stop the spread of Western technology through limitations on Chinese private companies would be extremely difficult, as it would have to be fairly encompassing, which could hurt tensions between the United States and China, as well as have negative consequences on economic interaction between the two countries.
One of the ways the United States attempts to control the spread of Western technology to China is through domestic policy and cooperation with its international allies, particularly in Europe. Domestically, the United States has established an entity list which “identifies companies and individuals subject to specific trade-license requirements” (Duchâtel 2023, 62). This policy seeks to control the export of American goods with technologies that could be used for military purposes to China. This policy also extends to third-party nations that produce goods with American technology, requiring them to obtain a U.S. license for the export of said goods, commonly known as the Foreign Direct Product Rule (Duchâtel 2023, 57). The control of exports by the United States has been a direct result of China’s MCF initiative and seeks to control technology diffusion to China. The United States has also encouraged its allies in Europe to follow a similar path; however, this has been a difficult process as there have been disagreements over the perceived threat of technological diffusion to China. Some European nations have taken the stance that economic ties with China are more important than the threat of diffusion of Western technology, as China is the “second-largest recipient of licensed transfers of dual-use European technology” ((Duchâtel 2023, 69). An example of this would be Airbus Helicopters, a company headquartered in France, agreeing to supply China with the same type of helicopters the French navy uses (Duchâtel 2023, 69). Despite these efforts, it's clear that the United States has a long way to go in developing necessary guardrails to prevent the diffusion of dual-use technology to China, as there seem to be very few signs that Xi Jinping and the CCP are going to abandon this initiative (Bitzinger 2021, 6).
Understandings from Current Literature
Current literature appears to be explicit about the failures of China’s military-civil fusion development strategy. The barriers currently in place, which have existed for decades, hinder China’s ability to encourage innovation within the private sector which would allow China to effectively close the military technological gap between itself and the United States in an efficient and timely manner. There’s also the fact that modern technology is difficult to replicate and requires significant time and investment (Gilli and Gilli 2019, 187). These boundaries have proven difficult to overcome for the CCP, as there’s a general desire within the party to maintain control over Chinese industry and military modernisation efforts to ensure that an effective level of secrecy is maintained. This has created a system plagued with bureaucracy, government overreach into private industry, and the dominance of state-owned companies (Ding 2024, 200). To overcome these boundaries, the most logical step for the CCP would be to give up one of the elements that has kept the party in power since its founding in 1949; control.
Although China’s strategy of military-civil fusion has yet to yield results that would close the technological gap between itself and the United States, the strategy is not insignificant to the current and future state of U.S. national security and U.S.-Chinese relations. Military modernisation has taken place, with China placing an emphasis on military strength and establishing itself as a modern military force within the next two decades. Since the 1990s, China’s military expenditures have risen from approximately 21 billion dollars (Maizland 2020) a year to 236 billion dollars a year in 2024 (McGerty 2024). China’s naval buildup has also increased dramatically over the past few decades, with China boasting the largest naval fleet by number of total ships (Congressional Research Service 2024a, 2). While the U.S. Navy operates ships that are more technologically advanced compared to that of the Chinese Navy (Palmer, Carroll, and Velazquez 2024), the significant buildup of naval capabilities and growing rhetoric in Beijing about becoming a modern military force highlights China’s desire to, if nothing else, establish itself as a formidable military superpower within the East Asia region, both on land and especially on water (Congressional Research Service 2024a, 4). Military Civil Fusion development strategy is a core policy of the Chinese Communist Party and has been strongly emphasised by Xi Jinping, with no indications that either the party or its leader are planning on abandoning the strategy as a whole. China’s efforts to modernise its military have come at the expense of U.S. national security interests through the form of attempted disruptions of key U.S. technological infrastructure by Chinese hacking entities (Department of Justice 2024). It is clear that the CCP will continue to use all resources at its disposal to close the technological gap between itself and the United States, and will look for any opportunity to gain an advantage in its military modernisation process. The question of China’s Military-Civil Fusion development strategy’s effectiveness up until this point has been answered, the question that faces officials in the United States now is how the strategy will assist or hinder China’s military modernisation moving forward amidst the fourth industrial revolution and the rise of artificial intelligence.
The Fourth Industrial Revolution and AI
The following analysis will examine the exponential growth of artificial intelligence (AI) over the past decade and its implications for the power dynamics between the United States and China. The rise of AI has been multifaceted, with implications for economic growth and military innovation, effectively classifying AI as a dual-use technology. Both the United States and China have placed a strong emphasis on the development of AI capabilities for both military and private-sector use (Hine 2024). But what does this mean for the rise of China and its power competition with the United States? It is necessary to examine both the economic implications of AI amidst the fourth industrial revolution, and the subsequent military possibilities that arise from this advanced technology.
To understand the economic implications of AI, a reflection on previous industrial revolutions is necessary. Jeffrey Ding, author of the book Technology and the Rise of Great Powers: How Diffusion Shapes Economic Competition, provides an extensive analysis of prior industrial revolutions and their effect on shifting power dynamics, as well as the key factors that determined how rising powers surpassed established powers with successful diffusion of industrial revolution technologies. Ding argues that economic success in an industrial revolution is not determined by the country which can make the most significant developments in technology, but rather, success is determined by a nation’s ability to broadly diffuse general purpose technologies (GPTs) across its economy (Ding 2024, 15-16). This is what Ding refers to as GPT Diffusion Theory. To demonstrate his theory, he reflects on the previous three industrial revolutions, the first being the invention of the steam engine in Britain in the 1760s, the second being the emergence of electricity, gas, and oil as energy sources in Germany and the United States in the 1870s, and the third being the emergence of Nuclear power and technological innovations like the computer in Japan in the 1960s (iED Team 2019). Ding asserts that the nations which experienced the most economic success during these periods were the countries that were able to broadly diffuse technologies across their economies as a result of their workforce's willingness and ability to adopt said technologies. Ding argues that Britain’s success lay in its broad diffusion of steel production and iron machinery (Ding 2024, 70), the United States’s success in its adoption of interchangeable parts, specifically in manufacturing (Ding 2024, 89-90), and Japan’s ability to quickly adopt and implement technology like computers across various industries (Ding 2024, 131-132). Now, that’s not to say that any country can simply start diffusing GPTs across all sectors of the economy and become the economic powerhouse of the world. There are two key factors to consider when it comes to the diffusion of GPTs, one being the infrastructure required to sustain diffusion, which Ding refers to as “GPT Skill Infrastructure”, and the other being an economy’s willingness and ability to adopt GPTs and use them effectively.
Firstly, proper infrastructure is necessary to support the diffusion of GPTs across entire economies. This infrastructure comes through investments in specialised education and opportunities for the broader workforce to receive training on GPT implementation and use (Ding 2024, 8). When it comes to China’s approach, there are benefits and costs to its top-down approach to infrastructure development. Firstly, the CCP plays a major role in China’s AI development as its interests lie in both the economic and military promises of AI, tying back to MCFDS and China’s willingness to utilise all tools at its disposal for the development of dual-use technologies (Omaar 2024). The Chinese government is utilising its private industry and universities to further advance AI development for both military and civilian uses with significant funding made by the CCP into AI R&D (Omaar 2024). China has taken an aggressive strategy when it comes to AI development and despite its value of incoming investments and the number of AI companies being less than that of the United States (Omaar 2024), its successes in the AI realm have been substantial, with around 47% of the top 20% of AI researchers originating from China, compared to 18% originating from the United States ("The Global AI Talent Tracker 2.0"). On top of that, the quality of Chinese Universities and students graduating from said universities with AI science undergraduate degrees has improved significantly over the past decade, with Tsinghua University ranking as the third-best institution for AI research in 2022, behind only Google and Stanford University ("The Global AI Talent Tracker 2.0"). Chinese investment in AI is putting it on course to challenge and perhaps overcome the United States as the leader in AI technology; however, right now, the U.S. maintains its position as leader, with around 60% of top AI institutions being located in the United States ("The Global AI Talent Tracker 2.0"). It’s also important to recognise the setbacks China has encountered in its AI development. Much like the roadblocks seen with the implementation of MCI and MCF, government bureaucracy stands in the way of Chinese AI development, with China taking a more top-down approach through heavy government involvement and oversight in the Chinese private sector (Ding 2024, 200). Compared to the US’s system, which is subject to market demand, many AI firms in China prioritise meeting the needs of the government, rather than following the direction of the free market (Ding 2024, 201). This is one of the limits of China’s Military-Civil Fusion development strategy which has historically limited innovation and could lead to a wider AI technological gap between the United States and China. That being said, the top-down approach of the CCP ensures a significant allocation of resources from the Chinese government towards dual-use development of AI, and if Ding’s argument is correct, this could still mean that if China’s innovation falls behind the United States, it still has the potential to diffuse AI across its economy and overtake the United States as the dominant economic force, much like how other rising powers have in previous industrial revolutions.
There’s also the military aspect that comes with AI development, and how that might affect U.S.-Chinese relations, especially amidst a time of significant military buildup in the East Asia region, and concerns around direct conflict between both nations over Taiwan. If China’s private sector can broadly diffuse AI technology, it is safe to assume that the CCP will continue to enact MCFDS to develop AI systems for both civilian and military use. The implications for AI in a military capacity are significant, with the possibility of streamlining decision-making through more efficient intelligence gathering and data analysis (Johnson 2020, 17-18). The implications go beyond more efficient decision-making, but AI development paves the way for autonomous warfare, threat identification and elimination, and infiltration and destruction of foreign technological infrastructure, all without human input (Csernatoni 2024). When it comes to AI military development in China, and around the world for that matter, there are two primary schools of thought, instrumentalism vs morals (Haotian 2023, 145-146). The primary debate is whether or not human input should be at the core of AI development to prevent fully autonomous warfare. There are serious humanitarian concerns that come with a system of warfare in which decisions are made entirely by machines that primarily make decisions based on data and calculations of the most strategically optimal outcomes which, at its current stage of development, cannot incorporate human intuition and rationality, like ethical decision-making based on contextual factors beyond provided data. One of the dilemmas this creates, beyond the humanitarian concerns, is the potential escalation of conflict even in times of peace between nuclear powers, as current understandings of nuclear deterrence are based on rational decision making by humans, but fail to account for how AI could reshape deterrence (Johnson 2021, 438). This of course would pose an inherent
risk for the United States as China and itself are both nuclear-armed nations with significant military capabilities. The risk of widening conflict would be detrimental to both nations as they possess capabilities of mass destruction, not only to themselves, but to other regional actors that might inadvertently get caught up in conflict between the two great powers, particularly in the East Asia region.
The rise of AI in the 21st century and the subsequent arms race it has created has resulted in some likening its effects to that of the nuclear bomb and the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union (Csernatoni 2024). AI has the potential to redefine warfare as is currently understood, and as a result, many international groups are calling for international guidelines and regulations to be put in place to prevent development from spiralling into an arms race of systems designed for mass destruction. As mentioned previously, there are two primary advocates of AI development and regulation in China, and while those calling for regulation and responsible development tend to be the majority camp, there is still a small subset that believe that the capabilities of AI as a military tool should be explored to the fullest extent as a means to strengthen China’s military capabilities (Haotian 2023, 148). The question becomes, how effective will international governance be at preventing military AI development from devolving into an unchecked arms race given China’s determination to establish itself as a world-class military force? When examining this question, it’s important to understand that China has a tendency to push the boundaries of international law, as seen with existing and ongoing developments in the South China Sea which has seen oversteps by the Chinese Navy and Air force into disputed territory not controlled by the PRC (Congressional Research Service 2024b, 9-11).
Conclusion
China’s Military-Civil Fusion development strategy has faced various setbacks over the past few decades, despite efforts to overcome these challenges and streamline the nation’s military modernisation efforts. Regardless of these setbacks, MCFDS still poses a threat to U.S. national security and with no indication of a willingness to abandon the strategy, U.S. policymakers are tasked with determining what the best strategies moving forward may be to ensure that China’s military modernisation efforts do not undermine U.S. security interests, both domestically and abroad. The best course of action for the United States to take is one that avoids direct confrontation and prevents a souring of relations with the People’s Republic of China. Based on current literature, it is clear that China’s Military-Civil Fusion development strategy faces serious challenges that the country has been unable to overcome for decades, and it is unclear at this current moment if the CCP is posed to make the meaningful changes to its governing system that might allow for a more effective civil-military relation when it comes to technological development for both civilian and military use. As Jeffrey Ding articulated in his book, “Like a marathon on a wide road, great power competition over GPTs is a test of endurance” (Ding 2024, 210). It’s important to acknowledge the fact that I am by no means a policy expert, and I do not assume to have a full understanding of the relationship between the United States and China, as the power struggle between the two nations is far more nuanced and multifaceted than previous examples of rising powers versus established powers. That being said, I do believe, based on my understanding of current literature, the U.S. should not focus its efforts on undermining China’s development strategy, but should instead focus its efforts internally by strengthening its technological infrastructure, investing in domestic AI development, and working with allies to enforce stricter export controls on dual-use technology, especially technology that relates to artificial intelligence. The name of the game is building our own strength while maintaining commitment to recognising the sovereignty of our adversaries, rather than investing resources into opportunities to sabotage foreign actors with the risk of failure and undermining any pre-existing positive relations.
Read the original paper here.
Bibliography
BBC, “What does Xi Jinping's China Dream mean?”, 2013, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-22726375
Besha, Patrick. “Civil-Military Integration in China: A Techno-Nationalist Approach to Development.” American Journal of Chinese Studies 18, no. 2 (2011): 97–111.
Bitzinger, Richard A. “China’s Shift from Civil-Military Integration to Military-Civil Fusion.” Asia Policy 16, no. 1 (2021): 5–24. doi:10.1353/asp.2021.0001.
Congressional Research Service, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress (2024a). https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/RL33153.pdf.
Congressional Research Service, U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas: Background and Issues for Congress (2024b). https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R42784.pdf.
Can, Muhammed, and Alena Vieira. “The Chinese Military-Civil Fusion Strategy: A State Action Theory Perspective.” The International Spectator 57, no. 3 (2022): 85–102. doi:10.1080/03932729.2022.2080262.
Chafetz, Glenn. "How China's Political System Discourages Innovation and Encourages IP Theft." The SAIS Review of International Affairs. July 31, 2023. https://saisreview.sais.jhu.edu/how-chinas-political-system-discourages-innovation-and-encourages-ip-theft/.
Csernatoni, Raluca. "Governing Military AI Amid a Geopolitical Minefield." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. July 17, 2024. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/07/governing-military-ai-amid-a-geopolitical-minefield?lang=en.
Duchâtel, Mathieu. “Europe’s China Problem: How Not to Feed Beijing’s Military-Civil Fusion.” Survival (London) 65, no. 4 (2023): 55–78. doi:10.1080/00396338.2023.2239059.
Evron, Yoram. “China’s Military-Civil Fusion and Military Procurement.” Asia Policy 16, no. 1 (2021): 25–44. doi:10.1353/asp.2021.0002.
Evron, Yoram and Richard Bitzinger. The Fourth Industrial Revolution and Military-Civil Fusion : A New Paradigm for Military Innovation? Cambridge, United Kingdom ; Cambridge University Press, 2023.
Fritz, Audrey. "China's Evolving Conception of Civil-Military Collaboration." Center for Strategic & International Studies. August 2, 2019. https://www.csis.org/blogs/trustee-china-hand/chinas-evolving-conception-civil-military-collaboration.
Gilli, Andrea, and Mauro Gilli. “Why China Has Not Caught Up Yet: Military-Technological Superiority and the Limits of Imitation, Reverse Engineering, and Cyber Espionage.” International Security 43, no. 3 (2019): 141–89. doi:10.1162/isec_a_00337.
Haotian, Qi. "China’s Evolving AI Development: Emergent Process Transcending Instrumentalism and Morality" In The AI Wave in Defence Innovation, edited by Michael Raska and Richard A. Bitzinger, 136-155. London: Routledge, 2023.
Hine, Emmie. "US-China AI Competition at the Crossroads between Dialogue and Decoupling." East Asia Forum. September 14, 2024. https://eastasiaforum.org/2024/09/14/us-china-ai-competition-at-the-crossroads-between-dialogue-and-decoupling/.
iED Team. "A Brief History of The 4 Industrial Revolutions that Shaped the World." Institute of Entrepreneurship Development. June 30, 2019. https://ied.eu/project-updates/the-4-industrial-revolutions/.
Johnson, James S. “Artificial Intelligence: A Threat to Strategic Stability.” Strategic Studies Quarterly : SSQ 14, no. 1 (2020): 16–39.
Johnson, James. “Deterrence in the Age of Artificial Intelligence & Autonomy: A Paradigm Shift in Nuclear Deterrence Theory and Practice?” Defense & Security Analysis 36, no. 4 (2020): 422–48. doi:10.1080/14751798.2020.1857911.
Kania, Elsa B, and Lorand Laskai. “Myths and Realities of China’s Military-Civil Fusion Strategy.” Center for a New American Security Reports, 2021.
Lee, Yen. "Here Are 4 Charts that Show China’s Rise as a Global Economic Superpower." CNBC. September 23, 2019. https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/24/how-much-chinas-economy-has-grown-over-the-last-70-years.html.
Maizland, Lindsay. "China’s Modernizing Military." Council on Foreign Relations. February 5, 2020. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-modernizing-military.
Manuel, Anja, and Kathleen Hicks. "Can China’s Military Win the Tech War? How the United States Should—And Should Not—Counter Beijing’S Civil-Military Fusion." Foreign Affairs. July 29, 2020. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-07-29/can-chinas-military-win-tech-war.
Omaar, Hodan. "How Innovative Is China in AI?" Information Technology and Innovation Foundation. August 26, 2024. https://itif.org/publications/2024/08/26/how-innovative-is-china-in-ai/.
Palmer, Alexander, Henry Carroll, and Nicholas Velazquez. "Unpacking China’s Naval Buildup." Center for Strategic & International Studies. June 5, 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/unpacking-chinas-naval-buildup#:~:text=Submarine%20capabilities%20remain%20an%20area,%2C%20stealth%2C%20and%20offensive%20power.
Satter, Raphael. "FBI Chief Says China Has Bigger Hacking Program than the Competition Combined." Reuters. September 18, 2023. https://www.reuters.com/world/fbi-chief-says-china-has-bigger-hacking-program-than-competition-combined-2023-09-18/.
"The Global AI Talent Tracker 2.0." MacroPolo. Paulson Institute, https://macropolo.org/interactive/digital-projects/the-global-ai-talent-tracker/.
Thompson, Drew. “The Rise of Xi Jinping and China’s New Era: Implications for the United States and Taiwan.” Issues and Studies - Institute of International Relations, vol. 56, no. 1, 2020, pp. 1–25, https://doi.org/10.1142/S1013251120400044.
United States, Bureau of Industry and Security, § 730.3 “Dual use” and other types of items subject to the EAR, 2013. https://www.bis.gov/ear/title-15/subtitle-b/chapter-vii/subchapter-c/part-730/ss-7303-dual-use-and-other-types-items
United States Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, October 19, 2023. https://media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF
United States Department of Justice, U.S. Government Disrupts Botnet People’s Republic of China Used to Conceal Hacking of Critical Infrastructure, January 31, 2024. https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-government-disrupts-botnet-peoples-republic-china-used-conceal-hacking-critical.
Yang, Zi. “Opening Up While Closing Up: Balancing China’s State Secrecy Needs and Military-Civil Fusion.” Asia Policy 16, no. 1 (2021): 45–64. doi:10.1353/asp.2021.0003.
