Why Authoritarianism Persists in the Middle East
Democracy in the Middle East has been on a decline over the past two decades, and there are no indications that that is set to change any time soon. This phenomenon is not unique to the Middle East, as Freedom House has recorded a worldwide decrease in democracy over the last 19 years in a row (Freedom House) Despite this global trend, the Middle East has long been a region where democracy has failed to make significant developments. This prompts the question, why does democracy appear to be such an incompatible form of governance in the Middle East? As Larry Diamond writes in his article titled “Why Are There No Arab Democracies?”, studies show that democracy is a strongly popular form of governance among Arabs, with over 80% in various surveys indicating that democracy would be their preferred form of governance (2010). Despite the overwhelming support for democracy, it has yet to materialise into actual governance in the Middle East. There was a period where prospects of democracy seemed to become more attainable when starting in 2010, the Arab Spring broke out throughout the Middle East with pro-democracy movements gaining serious traction. Despite this, there were only a select few movements that brought about democratic reform, and even those have failed the test of time, with most Middle Eastern countries ranking very low on the freedom scale, and over 90% of people in the Middle East living in countries rated “not free” (Freedom House, 2024). What are the primary drivers which have created an environment in which democracy struggles to embed itself in Middle Eastern society? This essay will argue that two primary factors, rentier economies and security-driven governance, explain the persistence of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East.
To understand the failure of democracy to take shape on a wider scale in the Middle East, it’s important to understand the context and history of the region and how its economy has contributed to the prevalence of authoritarian regimes. The Middle East is a region riddled with foreign influence and intervention, primarily since the end of the First World War. As Larry Diamond highlights in his article, Western powers have on multiple occasions supported autocrats in the Middle East for economic reasons, particularly as it relates to the production of oil, specifically since the end of the First World War (2010). Foreign aid from Western countries has also become a major source of revenue for various Arab regimes. Egypt was a primary example that received significant aid from Western countries and also faced large opposition during the Arab Spring but ultimately ended up installing another authoritarian leader. Another important factor to consider is the economy of the nations themselves. As Selin Bölme writes in her article titled “The Roots of Authoritarianism in the Middle East”, there is a key characteristic of the economies of some Middle Eastern countries which often results in democratic movements not having as strong of a social base. These characteristics are commonly referred to as “rentier economies” where exports, such as oil, coupled with foreign aid result in virtually no need for government taxation, as governments distribute oil wealth through social programs and jobs, reducing the population’s incentive to push for political change. Unlike in Western nations, where taxation often comes with demands for representation, Middle Eastern rentier states do not rely on tax revenue, disincentivising public pushes for democracy (Bölme, 2017). But as Bölme points out, this is one of many factors that contribute to the prevalence of authoritarianism. Not all Middle Eastern countries are oil-rich and can survive off exports and foreign aid alone.
Another important factor to consider is the security apparatus of authoritarian states and the ability to repress social mobilisation. This has been a key aspect of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East, especially after the end of colonial rule by Western Powers. Before the success of independence movements in the Middle East, government structures established by colonial powers were often weak and lacked local legitimacy, as they were established to be extensions of the colonial power, rather than a system by which self-governance could occur (Bölme, 2017). As a result, governance in the Middle East has relied primarily on the will of the military to support the regime’s legitimacy as the governing body. Eva Bellin provides an outstanding analysis on the role of the military in maintaining authoritarian regimes, with her analysis specifically reflecting on the Arab Spring and its failure to bring about meaningful democratic reform. She writes in her article titled “Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East” how Western countries, specifically in the 21st century, have valued stability over democratisation in the Middle East given the rise of extremism and terrorism (Bellin, 2012). The United States alone has contributed billions of dollars in military support over the past two decades to various regimes in the Middle East to combat extremism and maintain order (U.S. Department of State, 2000-2020). These militaries, as Bellin notes, have been the deciding factor of the preservation of authoritarian regimes. Militaries with stronger personal connections to the regime, rather than a well-structured, formalistic military, are often more willing to put down dissent against the regime, and this was seen in countries like Bahrain and Syria (Bellin, 2012). Whereas in countries like Egypt, with a clearer structure of their military, the military was not willing to attack protestors, and as a result, the regime was ousted. The military has been the strongest indicator of whether or not social movements can get off the ground and have, to some degree, substantial societal implications. Unfortunately, in many Middle Eastern countries, the military and intelligence agencies have done their job at halting democratic movements and preserving authoritarian regimes.
When it comes to figuring out the best way forward for democracy in the Middle East, there are some theorists, such as Seymour Lipset, who argue that economic development leads to democracy by strengthening education, the middle class, and political participation, as he writes “the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain a democracy” (1959). Although it would be nice to believe that this theory could apply to the Middle East, it fundamentally falls short for a multitude of reasons. Firstly, this way of interpreting the connection between modernisation and liberalisation is almost entirely based on a Western model (Dunn, 2013). When applying it to the Middle East, we see that the logic of the theory fails to hold up. For example, the Middle East is not entirely a developing nation; countries like the UAE, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia all have relatively high economic development and authoritarian governments (Council on Foreign Relations Education, 2024). As mentioned previously, these rentier economies make enough revenue from foreign aid and exports that taxation isn’t necessary for the government to operate. These governments also often provide a share of the revenue to the population, disincentivising any reason to revolt against the government (Bölme). Modernisation theory fails to hold up in the Middle East, or anywhere else except the West, as democracy rates continue to decline around the world.
In conclusion, the prominence of authoritarian regimes and the failure of democracy to establish itself as a prominent governing system in the Middle East is a result of the region's colonial legacy, rentier economic states, and the use of militaries to maintain authoritarian regimes. While some believe modernisation is the best path forward when it comes to democratic development in the region, this paper argues that modernisation theory is not an adequate approach to understanding the course for the Middle East, and instead argues that the two identified factors provide the clearest explanation of the lack of democracy in the region. If democracy is the ultimate goal for the Middle East, as popular opinion would suggest, then significant reform needs to take place for this to materialise. The Middle East has long been a region filled with conflict and instability but does have the potential to reorient its course towards a democratic future.
Works Cited
Bellin, E. (2012). Reconsidering the robustness of authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring, Comparative Politics, 44(2): 127-149.
Bölme, S. M. (2015). The roots of authoritarianism in the Middle East. In Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Before and After the Arab Uprisings (pp. 7-37). London: Palgrave Macmillan UK
Council on Foreign Relations Education (2024). Economics: Middle East and North Africa. Council on Foreign Relations. https://education.cfr.org/learn/learning-journey/middle-east-and-north-africa-essentials/economics-middle-east-and-north-africa
Diamond, L. (2010). Democracy's Past and Future: Why are there no Arab democracies? Journal of Democracy, 21(1): 93-104.
Dunn, T. M. (2013) The Failings of Liberal Modernisation Theory. E-International Relations. https://www.e-ir.info/2013/06/26/the-failings-of-liberal-modernisation-theory/
Freedom House (2025, February 26). NEW REPORT: mid Unprecedented Wave of Elections, Political Violence and Armed Conflict Fueled 19th Consecutive Year of Decline in Global Freedom. Freedom House. https://freedomhouse.org/article/new-report-amid-unprecedented-wave-elections-political-violence-and-armed-conflict-fueled
Freedom House (2024, February 29). NEW REPORT: Freedom in the Middle East Remains Out of Reach for Most as Israel and the Gaza Strip Experienced the Region’s Sharpest Setbacks. Freedom House. https://freedomhouse.org/article/new-report-freedom-middle-east-remains-out-reach-most-israel-and-gaza-strip-experienced
International Energy Agency. (2023). The energy world is set to change significantly by 2030, based on today’s policy settings alone. International Energy Agency. https://www.iea.org/news/the-energy-world-is-set-to-change-significantly-by-2030-based-on-today-s-policy-settings-alone
Lipset, S. M. (1959). Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy. American Political Science Review, 53(1), 69–105. doi:10.2307/1951731
U.S. Department of State. (2000-2020). Foreign assistance by country. ForeignAssistance.gov. https://www.foreignassistance.gov
*Any implied information is credited to class lectures
