Democratisation and Inclusion-Moderation In Syria
Since the collapse of the Assad regime in December 2024, Syria has reasserted itself as a “must-watch” state for political scientists. Given the sudden nature of the collapse and the subsequent power vacuum it has left, the question for the country is what power system will emerge, and more importantly, who will emerge on top to oversee Syria’s development in a post-Assad era? With the presence of various factions composed of competing militias, radical ideological groups, and foreign-backed proxies, the prospect of lasting peace and cooperation within the country does not seem plausible. Some point to the “inclusion-moderation” hypothesis, which posits that involvement in formal democratic processes will bring about ideological moderation of extremist groups in exchange for political legitimacy, as a potential route that Syria could take to address the current division and presence of extremist forces. However, there are a multitude of factors that make this possibility, at least within the near future, almost impossible. This essay argues that the inclusion-moderation hypothesis will fail in Syria because the country lacks historical democratic institutions, has suffered a complete collapse of state structures, remains dominated by extremist groups, and continues to experience destabilising foreign interference.
A critical factor to consider is the characteristics of the inclusion-moderation hypothesis and the conditions that need to be met for the hypothesis to be confirmed within a political environment. By establishing this understanding of the hypothesis, an analysis of Syria and its fate following the collapse of the Assad regime is possible. Jillian Schwedler (2011) provides an outstanding breakdown of the hypothesis and its various nuances in her article titled “Can Islamists Become Moderates? Rethinking the Inclusion-Moderation Hypothesis.” In her article, Schwedler discusses how there are two main models of moderation seen when extremist groups are incorporated into political processes: behavioural moderation and ideological moderation. Behavioural moderation often comes first in the process, though that isn’t always the case, and is typically seen through the abandonment of “more radical tactics” like violence, and instead a conformity to the norms of the existing political system. While this model does have its benefits, this doesn’t always lead to structural change within extremist groups and can instead be used as a tool to garner public support for the cause. Schwedler (2011, pp. 352) notes that for any real behavioural moderation to take place, incentives within the political system must exist and outweigh the benefits of continued extremist action. However, behaviour moderation is not always sufficient to bring about ideological change, which is ultimately the goal of this hypothesis. Schwedler (2011, pp. 360) argues that engaging in debates, adhering to outcomes of internal votes, and having a guiding, charismatic leader within extremist groups is what ultimately brings about ideological moderation. Without these factors, institutional incentives are often not enough to bring about substantial reform within extremist groups.
When examining the situation in Syria, there are many reasons to doubt that this hypothesis will be confirmed anytime soon. Syria lacks meaningful democratic institutions through which it can build a means for different groups to come together in a democratic process. As Selin Bölme (2015, pp. 15) writes in her article titled “The Roots of Authoritarianism in the Middle East”, “when a large number of Middle Eastern countries gained independence after World War II, the new states inherited weak institutions, weak civil societies and a limited substantive power structure.” Syria was one of these states, and its institutions continued to remain weak during the civil war. At the outset of the Arab Spring and the subsequent Civil War in Syria, Bashar Al-Assad utilised the military and weakened institutions to maintain legitimacy and consolidate state power. Institutions were weakened in favour of regime-consolidated power, which has left virtually no institutions that could be tasked with bringing about major reforms following the collapse of the Assad regime (Bellin, 2012, pp. 129). This presents a challenge to the hypothesis, as it is built on extremist groups having the opportunity to engage in the political system within the state. Right now, the political state in Syria is in complete disarray, leaving very little in the way for meaningful engagement from extremist groups. In the absence of a functioning state, extremist groups have no political arena in which to engage. Without a stable political structure to provide incentives for nonviolent engagement, the core foundations identified by Schwedler cannot operate, making the inclusion-moderation hypothesis inapplicable in Syria's current environment.
Beyond the lacking institutions within Syrian society, it is important to understand the main actors that play a role in shaping the region’s conflict, and why there is a lack of moderate opposition groups within the country. Before Bashar al-Assad came to power, moderate political groups like the Muslim Brotherhood were actively targeted by his father, Hafez al-Assad, and were driven into exile (Lynch, 2010, pp. 479). Following the beginning of the Syrian Civil War, the Bashar al-Assad regime targeted moderate Syrian opposition groups through military force to eliminate opposition to the regime (Esposito, 2015, pp. 1074). The violent elimination of moderate opposition created a vacuum that allowed extremist groups to rise to prominence, positioning themselves as the primary challengers to the Assad regime. Many of the extremist groups in Syria receive significant backing and military support from neighbouring states like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkiye, thus complicating the goal of ideological moderation by incorporating foreign actors who may not care as much about political stability at the expense of military influence (Esposito, 2015, pp. 1074). On top of that, competing great powers like the United States and Russia back militarised factions in the region, and also maintain an active military presence within Syria (Saeed, 2025, pp. 11). In a landscape dominated by extremist factions, foreign intervention, and the near-total absence of moderate political forces, the development of inclusive political institutions capable of fostering ideological moderation is virtually impossible.
The collapse of the Assad regime has drawn significant attention back to Syria and its troubled future. While some optimists view this regime change as a catalyst event that will bring about major reform for the country, the reality of the situation is that the conditions necessary for the inclusion-moderation hypothesis to take root in Syria do not exist at this time. As Schwedler (2011) outlines, the successful execution of this hypothesis requires functional political institutions and incentives for political participation. In a country which still sees a lack of existing democratic institutions, a lack of moderate opposition groups, and is still dominated by extremist forces and sectarian conflicts, the reality of Syria’s situation does not meet the conditions required for the hypothesis to take shape. With the absence of major international efforts of stabilisation or bottom-up state reconstruction, Syria is likely to remain trapped in a cycle of sectarian divide and conflict.
Works Cited
Bölme, S. M. (2015). The roots of authoritarianism in the Middle East. In Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Before and After the Arab Uprisings (pp. 7-37). London: Palgrave Macmillan UK.
Bellin, E. (2012). Reconsidering the robustness of authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring, Comparative Politics, 44(2): 127-149.
Esposito, J.L. (2015). Islam and Political Violence. Religions, 6(3): 1067‐1081.
Lynch, Marc (2010). Islam Divided Between Salafi-Jihad and the Ikhwan, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 33: 467-487.
Saeed, S. (2025). The crises in the Middle East: reshaping the region’s geopolitical landscape and altering the global order, Asian Review of Political Economy, 4(1): 1-14.
Schwedler, J. (2011). Can Islamists become moderates? Rethinking the inclusion-moderation hypothesis, World Politics, 63(2): 347-376.
